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The violation of ￿shing regulations is a criminal activity that leads to depleting ￿sh stock
levels across the world. This paper focuses on ￿shing violations in developing countries. In
particular, the paper analyses the use of a ￿shing net with illegal mesh size in a two regimes,
namely a management regime where each community claims a territorial use right over the
￿shery and a regulated open access regime. This paper employs a dynamic model for ￿shery
crimes that involve time and punishment to analyse the use of a net with illegal mesh size in the
di⁄erent regimes. We found that if the community has territorial use right, the illegal activity
in addition to decreasing the intrinsic growth rate and the cost of ￿shing would increase the
community￿ s e⁄ective discount rate and consequently result in a much lower equilibrium stock
and harvest relative to the situation where the community only use nets with the legal mesh size.
Furthermore, under a regulated open access management the equilibrium stock will be lower if
a community violates the regulation and the proportionate change in the risk of punishment is
higher than the proportionate change in the harvest potential. Moreover, the optimum penalty
for violation must be set higher in the open access ￿shery relative to the complete territorial
use right management regime.
Jel Classi￿cation: C61; Q21; Q22
Keywords: Crime; Dynamic Model; Fishery; Regulation
1 Introduction
The use of illegal ￿shing technologies have played a major role in ￿sh stock depletion in many
coastal developing countries where monitoring and enforcement of ￿shery regulations are far from
being complete. An illegal ￿shing technology generates a technological externality that may include
the opportunity cost of a mature and more valuable ￿sh in the future. A typical example of such
destructive technology is the use of a net with illegal mesh size which has characterised all types
of ￿sheries. According to the FAO (2001), the use of illegal nets, which are highly destructive, is
popular in many African countries and is widely used along the coasts, in lagoons, estuaries and
rivers. This situation does not di⁄er from prevailing situations in other continents. For example, it
has been noted that in a ￿shery in India, some ￿shers use stake nets with mesh sizes of less than
5mm in contiguous rows to ￿lter young prawns while the prescribed minimum is 35mm (Srinivasa,
2005).
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1Following the seminal paper by Becker (1968), considerable amounts of theoretical and empirical
research has been done on violation of ￿shing regulations. For the theoretical research, see e.g.
Sutinen and Anderson (1985), Anderson and Lee (1986), Charles et al. (1999), Hatcher (2005), and
Chavez and Salgado (2005). The empirical works include Furlong (1991), Hatcher et al. (2000)
and Hatcher and Gordon (2005). Consistent with Becker￿ s con￿guration, ￿shery economists have
considered ￿shing regulations such as closed area and quantity restrictions for which an illegal ￿sher is
a rational self-interested economic agent who maximises a one-period expected utility. Consequently,
the ￿sher engages in illegal ￿shing if the expected gain from violation outweighs the gain from legal
￿shing and to the extent that the expected marginal gain equates the expected ￿ne for violating the
regulation. A ￿shery crime that involves the use of an illegal ￿shing net is committed repeatedly
until it is detected, especially in developing countries where a ￿sher uses one net. Thus, the rational
￿sher who uses the illegal net weighs the stream of bene￿ts gained from legal ￿shing with the future
expected ￿ne resulting from using the illegal mesh size. This type of criminal activity, involving the
repeated use of illegal ￿shing gear and the potential negative impact of the use of the equipment on
a ￿shery, makes this type of activity a dynamic crime problem and has hardly been investigated in
the ￿shery economics literature (see Akpalu, 2008).
The dynamic nature of the problem requires a dynamic approach in analysis. Like the static
model used by Hatcher (2005) and Furlong (1991), the dynamic model presents the framework
for analysing the impact of changes in enforcement e⁄ort and penalty on the rate of violation.
Moreover, employing a dynamic speci￿cation that involves time and punishment rather than using
a static formulation provides some additional advantages. First, in the dynamic model of crime, the
violator weighs the stream of potential net bene￿ts obtainable from ￿shing illegally. Consequently,
if for example a community has a territorial use right over a management area, its e⁄ective discount
rate will determine the levels of exploitation and the optimum stock of the resource. The e⁄ective
discount rate is the sum of the individual rate of time preference or bene￿t discount rate and the
probability of detection (Davis, 1988). It is noteworthy that the probability of detection depends
on the choice of mesh size and enforcement e⁄ort of inspectors and a change in any of these two
variables will a⁄ect both the short-run and optimum harvest and stock levels. Furthermore, since
the use of the illegal gear a⁄ect the intrinsic growth rate of the stock (Boyd, 1966; Escapa & Prellezo,
2003)1 the dynamic model makes it possible to determine the impact of the illegal ￿shing on the
growth of the ￿sh stock. Moreover, if the criminal activity is committed repeatedly, the optimal
penalty can be evaluated in terms of the probability of detection and the marginal damage resulting
from the illegal activity.
Fisheries in many developing countries are managed as either a common property resource where
each community claims a territorial use right over a management area or as regulated open access
where a community can harvest any quantity of the resource across the entire management area
as long as a ￿shing regulation such as the mesh size regulation is obeyed (Akpalu, 2008). Due to
the fact that the use of the illegal ￿shing gear impacts ￿sh stocks, the optimal stocks have been
compared under these regimes. A ￿ne is generally considered costless and remains an important
policy instrument for ￿shery management. We therefore compare the ￿ne under the two regimes.
The ￿ndings are that the equilibrium ￿sh stock and harvest are much lower if the ￿sher uses the
illegal mesh size relative to a situation where he does not use it under the community use right
management regime. The di⁄erences in the stock levels stem from both the e⁄ect of the use of
the illegal net on the growth of the stock and the risk of punishment that scales up the e⁄ective
discount rate. Also, increasing the risk of punishment increases the optimal level of stock. Under a
regulated open access regime, the size of the equilibrium stock will depend on the ratio of elasticity
of catchability coe¢ cient that de￿nes the potential bene￿t from increased intensity of violation to
the elasticity of the risk of punishment. The equilibrium stock and harvest levels will be lower if the
elasticity of the catchability coe¢ cient is greater than some adjusted elasticity of the hazard rate.
1This speci￿cation contrasts with Armstrong and Clark (1997), and Garza-Gil (1998), who assumed that di⁄erent
technologies impact the harvest function, but not the growth function.
2Furthermore, with regards to the optimal ￿nes, it has been found that the ￿ne for continuous ￿shing
under regulated open access must be higher than that under community-owned ￿shery.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section (2), the model for territorial
use right in a ￿shery is presented, followed by a regulated open access ￿shery in section (3). The
conclusion of the paper is presented in the last section (4).
2 The Model
In this section, some de￿nitions and assumptions of the model of this paper are presented followed
by derivations of some results for the two management regimes that characterise ￿sheries manage-
ment in developing countries: where a community has the use right over the ￿shery within a given
management area and a regulated open access regime.
￿ Mesh size and stock dynamics
Suppose that a ￿shery has pelagic species, such as mackerel, anchovy, sardines etc., which have
relatively short periods of maturity and do not ￿t well into the standard age structure or cohort
model of Beverton-Holt (1957). Following Boyd (1966) and Armstrong (1999), suppose that the
intrinsic growth rate of the stock depends on an index of the inverse of the mesh size ￿￿(0;1) so
that the adjusted natural growth function depends on ￿sh biomass x and the mesh size which is
a control variable (i.e. ￿(x;￿) is the growth function)2. Since it is expected that decreasing the
mesh size may decrease the average size of harvested ￿sh and eventually decrease the number of egg
laying ￿sh, the following partial derivatives hold: ￿x(￿) > 0, ￿xx(￿) < 0 and ￿￿(￿) < 03. The stock
evolution or dynamics within a given management area is:
_ x = ￿(x;￿) ￿ h; (1)
where _ x ￿ dx
dt and h is harvest which is a control variable4.
￿ The harvest function and gross revenue
If constant returns to scale is assumed between ￿shing capacity (i.e., all the inputs used in ￿shing)
and e⁄ort (E(t)), the Schaefer harvest or production function of the ￿sher is:
h = f(x;E;￿) = a(￿):E:x; (2)
where a(￿) is the catchability coe¢ cient function and a￿ > 0 implying that reducing the mesh size
will increase harvest for any given levels of e⁄ort and stock. As noted by Mackinson et al. (1997),
changes in ￿shing technology impact on the catchability coe¢ cient. The simple Schaefer harvest
function is assumed for tractability.
￿ Market structure and total revenue from harvest
As noted earlier, two management regimes are considered in this paper, i.e., a situation where a
community has the use right over the ￿shery within a given management area and a regulated open
access management. In the former case although the community has some monopoly power over the
use of the ￿shery resource within the management area, there are usually several ￿shing communities
and a community cannot signi￿cantly in￿ uence the market price of the harvest. Moreover, it is also
inevitable that if the resource is managed as a regulated open access resource, no single community
could in￿ uence the price per unit of harvest. Consequently, we assume that the price per kilogram
of harvest is ￿xed at q so that the gross revenue that the ￿sher obtains from ￿shing is qh.
2Note that since the growth rate of the ￿sh depends on the stock and index for mesh size, it is possible to solve
for the stock as a function of mesh size and time from the growth function (i.e.x = x(￿;t))
3￿z and ￿zz are the ￿rst and second order partial derivatives of ￿(￿) with respect to z.
4It is assumed for simplicity that there is no net migration of stock across management areas.
3￿ The cost of harvest





where & is a constant per unit cost of e⁄ort and c(x;￿)h = c(E) = &E from equations (2) and (3).
Thus, the illegal ￿shing net has the advantage of reducing the unit cost of harvest but not the cost
per unit e⁄ort.
￿ The expected cost of illegal ￿shing
It is assumed that if the ￿sher is caught using the illegal net, he pays a ￿ne F. Following the
dynamic deterrence models of Davis (1988), Nash (1991) and Leung (1991, 1994), we assume that
the violator i does not know the exact time of detection but only some probability distribution of the
time of detection denoted gi(t) ￿
dGi(t)
dt which is the continuous time analogue of the probability in a
one-period expected utility model of Becker (1968). Where Gi(t) is the cumulative density function
(cdf) that de￿nes the probability that detection would have occurred at time t in the future. The
survivor function is therefore (1 ￿ Gi). Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume that the
violator will not be allowed to ￿sh anymore if caught and will have zero exogenous income for the
rest of the planning horizon. It is the case that illegal nets are seized when detected and we assume
that the user will lose his ￿shing license or will be barred from ￿shing. This harsh punishment
reduces the propensity to recidivate (Smith & Gartin, 1989). Thus, if the ￿sher is caught, he pays
an expected present value of a ￿ne of
T R
t0
Fgi(t)e￿￿itdt and gets nothing for the rest of the planning
horizon. Note that the future bene￿ts and costs are discounted at a discount rate of ￿i and since
￿shing nets are usually bequeathed to subsequent generations and mended continuously, we assume
that the ￿sher has a planning horizon T ! 1.
Let the probability that the o⁄ense will be detected within a very small interval of time t given
that it had not been detected in the past (i.e. the hazard rate or the instantaneous conditional
probability) be pi(￿;￿) =
gi
(1￿Gi)where ￿ is some exogenous enforcement e⁄ort of the management
authorities, pi￿ > 0 and pi￿￿ ￿ 05. The assumption that the hazard rate which is formed subjectively
depends on the illegal mesh size stems from the fact that the size composition of catch of a ￿sher
could signal his use of illegal mesh size. Using gi = pi(￿;￿)(1 ￿ Gi) the expected present value of




Moreover, we assume that mending the net to adjust the mesh size is costly. The cost of mending
ki(￿) is increasing in the intensity of violation of the mesh size regulation (i.e., ki￿ > 0). Note that
by implication the ￿sher does not incur this cost if he does not use illegal mesh size.
￿ Anti-crime policy instruments and property right regimes
Policy makers use two policy instruments to regulate illegal ￿shing. The instruments involve
increasing the risk of punishment and/or the severity of punishment. Increasing the risk of pun-
ishment also implies increasing the conditional probability of detection (i.e. pi(￿;￿)) by increasing
enforcement e⁄ort (i.e. ￿). With regards to mesh size regulation, the ￿shery authorities either in-
spect nets at shore and at sea or inspect minimum landing size of the main species together with the
existing mesh. Also the policy maker can increase the severity of punishment by increasing the ￿ne
or penalty. It is argued that while increasing the penalty is generally costless, increasing enforce-
ment e⁄ort is unambiguously costly. As noted by Kuperan and Sutinen (1998), public expenditures
5The speci￿cation of the (expected) probability as a function of violation level in a ￿shery and enforcement e⁄ort
is consistent with Hatcher (2005).
4on enforcement commonly constitute the largest cost element in regulatory programmes. In many
developing countries, enforcement e⁄orts are very low due to the high costs of monitoring and sur-
veillance. The high cost is una⁄ordable to governments making the use of penalty a more attractive
policy instrument (Akpalu, 2008). Moreover, since di⁄erent property right regimes in ￿sheries lead
to di⁄erent levels of capitalisation and exploitation of ￿sh stocks, the optimum ￿ne is expected to
di⁄er across the di⁄erent regimes.
2.1 Territorial use right in a ￿shery and illegal mesh size
Consider a situation where each community has the use right over a ￿shery management area.
In a typical ￿shing community in a developing country, ￿shing activities are organised around a
chief ￿sherman or the head of a beach management unit. A recent survey conducted in Ghana on
violation of light attraction regulation showed that nearly all ￿shers within a ￿shing community
violate the regulation if the chief ￿sherman does not comply with the regulation6. This section
therefore models the decision problem of the head of the community or the beach management unit
(i.e. the community social planner). Following the statement by Sandal and Steinshamn (2004),
that a commercial ￿sher may often operate within a short-term horizon when he makes his decision,
let the community social planner who is a representative agent commit to violating the mesh size
regulation at time t0.7 Let pi(:)be the hazard rate of the social planner, hi represent total harvest of
the community i and assume that net migration of the stock across the community management areas
is zero. It is assumed that if the illegal activity is detected, the community is carefully monitored to
ensure complete compliance in the future or could be barred completely from ￿shing. Since we are
interested in the impact of the illegal net on the levels of optimal stock and harvest, the analysis is
limited to the segment of the value function that deals with the illegal activity. Thus, none of these
two considerations will a⁄ect the outcome of our analysis and is ignored8. Beginning from the time





f((q ￿ c(x;￿))hi ￿ pi(￿;￿)F ￿ ki(￿))(1 ￿ Gi)ge￿￿itdt (4)
subject to
_ Gi = pi(￿;￿)(1 ￿ Gi); (5)
_ xi = ￿(x;￿) ￿ hi; (6)
with x ￿ 0, x(0) = x0 and ￿(0) = ￿0.
The constraints to equation (4) are the hazard rate (i.e. equation 5) which is an equation of
motion; and the ￿sh stock evolution equation (i.e. equation 6). As noted earlier, the values of ￿i
are inversely related to the mesh size9. These dynamics continue until the representative violator is
6The light attraction is the technique that involves the use of arti￿cial light in the night when the moon is out
to attract and aggregate ￿sh so that with any given level of e⁄ort, more ￿sh can be harvested. It is illegal to use
any light attraction equipment for ￿shing in Ghana. The project on violation of light attraction regulation in inshore
￿shery in Ghana is funded by CEEPA and is being undertaken by the author of this manuscript.
7Also due to the divergence between the short and long term impacts of a change in mesh size on catch, ￿shing
communities may simply not be convinced about the need for a mesh size regulation and may consequently violate it.





9In the coastal countries of West Africa, for example, there is evidence of illegal use of decreasing mesh size over
the years from the minimum legal size of 25mm to about 5mm (Yeboah, 2002). Consequently, it is reasonable to
assume that ￿ is a ￿ow variable. Moreover, we suppose that the ￿sheries authorities have full information on the
bio-dynamics of the ￿sh stock. Hence, the minimum legal mesh size will lead to a sustainable management of the ￿sh
stock.
5caught. Hence, the right hand side of the value function is multiplied by the survivor function.
The current value Hamiltonian associated with equations (4) through (6) for each ￿sher is equa-
tion (7). Following Johnston and Sutinen (1996), the shadow value of the ￿sh stock, ￿i(t), is
multiplied by the survivor function (i.e.￿i(t)(1￿Gi)) since the ￿sher does not bene￿t from the stock
after the illegal activity is detected. Note that ￿i(t) is the shadow cost of the cumulative density
function de￿ning the time of detection or simply the shadow cost of taking the risk.
H = ((q ￿ c(x;￿))hi ￿ pi(￿;￿)F ￿ ki(￿) + ￿ipi(￿;￿) + ￿i (￿(x;￿) ￿ h))(1 ￿ Gi) (7)
The maximum principle for the two control variables hi and ￿i are equations (8) and (9) respectively:
h = hmaxifq ￿ c(x;￿) > ￿i(andx > x￿￿)
h = 0ifq ￿ c(x;￿) < ￿i(andx < x￿￿): (8)
@H
@￿
= 0 : hi￿ (q ￿ ￿i) = pi￿ (F ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i￿i￿ + ki￿ (9)
where x￿￿ is the equilibrium stock under community territorial use right regime. Equation (8) de￿nes
inter-temporal pro￿t maximising level of harvest. Thus, pro￿t is maximised if the community chooses
a level of harvest that equates its marginal pro￿t (i.e. q ￿ c(x;￿)) to the adjusted shadow value of
the stock (i.e. ￿i). However, since hi is not an argument in the maximum principle (i.e. equation
8), a singular solution is not trivial. If q ￿ c(x;￿) > ￿i the existing stock exceeds what is optimally
desired hence harvest will be at its maximum (i.e. hi = himax). On the other hand, if q￿c(x;￿) < ￿i
the existing stock is lower than what is optimally desired so the ￿sher will not harvest any ￿sh at
all (i.e. hi = 0) until the stock recovers. For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that an interior
solution exists (i.e. x = x￿, q ￿c(x;￿) = ￿i and h
￿
i = (0;himax)) for tractability but without loss of
generality.
Equation (9) de￿nes inter-temporal pro￿t maximising illegal mesh size. Thus, the ￿sher will
choose the mesh size that equates expected net marginal bene￿t from violation (i.e. hi￿ (q ￿ ￿i)) to
the marginal cost (i.e. pi￿ (F ￿ ￿i) + ki￿ ￿ ￿i￿i￿) which is the di⁄erence between an adjusted ￿ne
and the shadow value of the growth of the stock. Note that since c(x;￿)h = &E,@(c(x;￿)h)￿@￿ =
@(&E)￿@￿ = 0. Equation (9) can be re-speci￿ed as:
F =
hi￿q + ￿i (￿i￿ ￿ hi￿) ￿ ki￿
pi￿
+ ￿i (10)
Following Leung (1991) and Hatcher (2005), it is assumed that the society derives bene￿ts from the
(illegal) harvest that is equivalent to the direct net revenue from harvest (q ￿ c(x;￿))hi￿ki(￿) since
the illegal catches are consumed. On the other hand, the society incurs a social cost of violation
that depends on the intensity of violation (i.e. mi(￿)). This social cost could be viewed as rent
lost due to the use of smaller than optimal mesh size. Consistent with the complete territorial use
right ￿shery, the social planner will optimise the net social bene￿t from violation subject to the
dynamic equation of the stock (i.e. equation 1)10. From the maximum principle, the marginal social
damage is mi￿ = hi￿q + ￿i (￿i￿ ￿ hi￿) ￿ ki￿ which is the numerator of the ￿rst term of equation





10The Hamiltonian for the problem is
H = (q ￿ c(x;￿))hi ￿ ki(￿) ￿ mi(￿) + ￿i
(￿(x;￿) ￿ hi)
.
6Clearly, the ￿ne is increasing in marginal social damage and the shadow value of the cumulative
probability of detection but decreasing in the marginal hazard rate.
Proposition 1 If a community that has use right over a ￿shery ￿shes using a net with illegal mesh
size, the equilibrium stock level will depend on the size of the mesh and an e⁄ective discount rate
(i.e. pure rate of time preference plus probability of detection). Consequently, if the illegal mesh size
is used, the equilibrium stock and harvest are much lower than if it is not used.
The proof of the preceding proposition is presented in the appendix. The basic idea here is
to derive and compare the optimum stock and harvest levels for a situation where the community
violates the regulation and the situation where it does not. In steady state _ x = 0 and the expression








= ￿ + p(￿v;￿); (11)
where x￿￿ is the equilibrium level of the stock if the ￿sher violates the regulation, ￿v is an index
for the inverse of illegal mesh size and ￿ + p(￿v;￿) is the e⁄ective discount rate. The corresponding
equilibrium harvest is h￿￿ = ￿(x￿￿;￿v). It could be inferred from equation (11) that x￿￿ = x(￿;￿v)
and also veri￿ed that @x
￿￿
@￿ > 0 and @x
￿￿
@￿v < 0. Consequently, an increase in enforcement e⁄ort, all
other things being equal, will increase the optimum stock while increased intensity of violation will
decrease the optimal stock. Moreover, a decrease in the illegal mesh size will result in a decrease
in the growth rate of the ￿sh stock and the cost of harvest but an increase in the e⁄ective discount
rate. The overall e⁄ect of this is a sharp decrease in the optimal level of stock.
Conversely, if the community does not violate the regulation, the corresponding steady state
interior solutions for the stock (i.e. equation 12) is computed from the solution from maximising











Comparing equations (11) and (12), it could be shown that if the community does not use the illegal
net, the optimum level of the stock will coincide with that of ￿shery management authority and will
be higher (see appendix for the proof). The implication as noted earlier is that increased exploitation
of the resource leads to a high reduction in the equilibrium stock.
2.2 Regulated Open Access Fishery and illegal mesh size
Due to the high rate and uneven migration of many ￿sh stocks, many ￿sheries are managed as open
access resources, particularly in developing countries. Suppose a ￿shery is organised as a regulated
open access where there is restriction on the mesh size but with no restriction on catch quantities.
As noted in the ￿shery literature, open access ￿sheries dissipate potential pro￿ts due to free entry
and exit of vessels in the industry (Gordon, 1954; Lueck, 1998). The competition for the stock
by very large users leaves the resource with no shadow value and the industry commits a level of
capacity that equates pro￿ts to zero. According to Edwards et al. (2004), a ￿sh stock does not have
any capitalised value in an open access or regulated open access resource since it is prohibitively
expensive for individuals to exclude others and conserve the asset for future use. From the zero
pro￿t condition, an expression for the optimal stock could be derived. Suppose there are N ￿shing
communities and each community represents a ￿shing unit with h(:) being the harvest of the unit.
Let the zero pro￿t condition of the unit be V00 = qa(￿L)xooEoo ￿ &:Eoo = 0, where c(:)h(:) = &:Eoo
and Eoo is open access level of e⁄ort (for all the communities). Consequently, the open access stock
level is xoo = &=￿
￿
￿L￿
q if legal mesh size is used. Using this as a benchmark, we analyse two
common cases of interest. The ￿rst is where the ￿shers in a community commit to ￿shing illegally
7and adjust their mesh size to ￿sh continuously until the illegal activity is detected while all other
communities obey the regulation. Here also we assume that the community leader is the local social
planner and what he does is copied by other members of his community. The second is where
the community occasionally ￿shes with the illegal net until the illegal activity is detected while all
other communities do not violate the regulation. Suppose that if the illegal activity is detected, the
￿sher pays a ￿ne Fo and his ￿shing activity is closely monitored to ensure that he does not violate
the regulation any more or is barred from ￿shing. The occasional ￿sher who violates the ￿shing
regulation will maximise the value function given by equation (13) with respect to the intensity of
violation11. The corresponding ￿rst order condition of the problem is equation (14).
Max
f￿v
igVi = (qhi ￿ c(x;￿v
i)hi ￿ p(￿v
i;￿)Fo ￿ k(￿v











Note that if p￿v







under the regulated open access regime.
Let H denote total harvest in the ￿shery (by all units or communities) so that H = hi0 + H￿i0
where h0 is open access levels of harvest for unit i and H￿i0 is the total harvest for all other N ￿ 1
communities that do not violate the regulation. If symmetry is assumed in open access equilibrium,
the pro￿t dissipation condition (i.e. equation 15) also holds. Thus,
q (hi0 + H￿i0) ￿ c(x0;￿v
i)(hi0 + H￿i0) ￿ pi(￿v
i)Fo ￿ k(￿v
i) = 0; (15)
or
q(a(￿v) + (N ￿ 1)a(￿L))eioxo ￿ Nceio ￿ pi(￿v
i)Fo ￿ k(￿v
i) = 0
where xo is open access level of stock, c(:)h(:) = N&:ei0 and Eo ￿ Neio is an open access level of
e⁄ort. For simplicity but without compromising generality, we assume that the adjustment cost of
the illegal net is zero (i.e. k(￿v
i) = 0). Combining equations (14) and (15) and substituting qh￿i for
















p(￿i) is the elasticity of hazard rate and "￿ = ￿ia￿
a(￿i) is the elasticity of catchability
coe¢ cient. It follows from the above equation that the necessary condition for the existence of
positive equilibrium stock is that the denominator must be positive. Moreover, an increase in the
hazard elasticity relative to the elasticity of the catchability coe¢ cient will lead to a reduction in
the optimal stock. Note that an increase in the hazard elasticity implies an increase in the e⁄ective
discount rate.
Proposition 2 If an illegal mesh size is used in a regulated open access ￿shery, the equilibrium
level of stock will be lower than otherwise if the elasticity of the catchability coe¢ cient is less than
the elasticity of the hazard rate.
11Since the ￿shery is characterised by free entry and exit, if the probability of getting away with the crime at
any point in time is 1 ￿ bi, following the standard model of Becker, the expected utility function is E(ui) =
(qhi ￿ c(x;￿i)hi ￿ k(￿i))(1 ￿ bi) + (qhi ￿ c(x;￿i)hi ￿ k(￿i) ￿ Fo)bi = qhi ￿ c(x;￿i)hi ￿ k(￿i) ￿ biFo. Moreover,
since the ￿sher will not be allowed to ￿sh anymore after the act is detected, expected utility is multiplied by the
survivor function and the result is the value function (i.e. equation 13).












8This implies that if ￿shing is done with the illegal mesh size, the regulated open access stock will
be higher than that which prevails in the absence of ￿shing illegally if x0 < x00 = &
a(￿L
i )q. As has
been shown in the appendix, if k(￿v
i) = 0 is assumed for simplicity we have "￿ < ￿￿. Consequently,
if a community violates the regulation, the optimum level of stock will be lower compared to the
situation where it does not violate the regulation if changing the illegal mesh size leads to a higher
than proportionate change in the risk of punishment relative to the proportionate change in the
bene￿t from harvest.
Now, suppose that a ￿shing community violates the regulation continuously until the illegal
activity is detected. The planner for the unit will maximise equation (13) with respect to the
intensity of violation subject to the hazard rate (i.e. equation 5). The corresponding Hamiltonian
and the maximum principle are equations (15a) and (16a) respectively.
Hoi = (qhi ￿ c(x;￿i)hi ￿ p(￿i;￿)Fo ￿ k(￿i) + ￿ip(￿i;￿))(1 ￿ Gi) (13a)
@Hio
@￿i
= 0 : p￿iF￿￿






Also the following pro￿t dissipation condition holds:
q (hi0 + H￿i0) ￿ c(x0;￿v
i)(hi0 + H￿i0) ￿ pi(￿v
i;￿)(Fo ￿ ￿i) ￿ k(￿v
i) = 0 (15a)
If it is assumed that the adjustment cost of the illegal net is zero (i.e. k(￿v
i) = 0 and equations (14)
















Note that equations (16) and (16a) are the same which implies, that all other things being equal,
the optimal level of stock that will prevail if the community violates the regulation occasionally will
be the same as what will prevail if it violates the regulation continuously given that the expected
marginal ￿ne equates the expected marginal gain from violation. Also, comparing the ￿nes under
the regulated open access, it is clear that due to the positive cost of taking the risk of doing illegal
￿shing continuously, the potential violator is more likely to be caught sooner than later and should
therefore be penalised less relative to the situation where the community violates the regulation
occasionally.
Proposition 3 The ￿ne for using a net with illegal mesh size in a regulated open access ￿shery where
a community ￿shes continuously must be higher than the ￿ne in a ￿shery where the community has
complete use right over the ￿shery but ￿shes illegally.
The proof presented in the appendix shows that F￿￿
o > F￿. The intuition here is that while the
community with complete use right over the ￿shery resource may be myopic from the societal point
of view and ￿sh with a net with illegal mesh size, it internalises the impact of harvesting activities
on the dynamics of the stock. Consequently, the steady state level of the ￿sh stock would be higher
and a relatively lower penalty is needed to correct the damage. Conversely, since the competition
for the stock in an open access resource may lead to overcapitalistion and overexploitation, with
the resource having no shadow value, ￿shing using the net with illegal mesh size exacerbates the
resource use externality and a relatively high penalty is needed to mitigate the externality.
93 Conclusion
This paper extends the one-period or static expected utility model to a dynamic one to accommodate
a chronic ￿shery crime problem in many (developing) countries. It incorporates time and punishment
to analyse the e⁄ect of using ￿shing nets with illegal mesh size on ￿sh stocks and harvest under the
two regimes. The ￿rst regime is where each community claims a territorial use right over the resource
in a management area and the second regime is regulated open access where each community can
harvest any quantity of the resource within the entire management area as long as the mesh size
regulation is obeyed. The optimum ￿ne necessary to discourage the illegal activity is derived and
compared under the two regimes.
It has been shown that if the community has territorial use right but ￿shes using a net with
illegal mesh size, the optimal stock and harvest will be much lower than what will prevail if there is
no illegal ￿shing. This is because in addition to the illegal mesh size decreasing the cost of harvest
and intrinsic growth rate of the stock, it increases the e⁄ective discount rate. Note that a higher
discount rate leads to increased harvest and stock levels. The e⁄ective discount rate is the sum of
bene￿t discount rate and the conditional probability of detection. However, if the ￿shery is managed
as a regulated open access resource, the optimum stock level will be lower if the net with illegal mesh
size is used and the elasticity of catchability coe¢ cient of the mesh size is lower than the elasticity
of the hazard rate.
An important policy recommendation from the analysis is that the ￿ne should be higher for
￿shing under open access compared to the situation where a community has the territorial use right
over a management area.
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4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof of the preceding proposition requires deriving and comparing the harvest levels under
the two situations. Let ￿v and ￿L denote indexes for the inverse of illegal and legal mesh sizes
respectively. The costate equation associated with the ￿sh stock from the Hamiltonian (i.e. equation
7) is _ ￿￿(￿ + p(￿v;￿))￿ = ￿@H
@x
1
1￿G, noting that from the Hamiltonian d
dt (￿(1 ￿ G)) = _ ￿(1￿G)￿￿g.
In steady state _ x = 0 and _ ￿ = 0. The expression for the optimal stock which is derived from the








= ￿ + p(￿v;￿); (A1)
where x￿￿ is the equilibrium level of the stock if the ￿sher violates the regulation. The corresponding
equilibrium harvest is h￿￿ = ￿(x￿￿;￿v). If the ￿sher does not violate the regulation, the correspond-
ing steady state interior solutions for the stock is computed from the solution from maximisation of












The corresponding steady state harvest is h￿ = ￿(x￿;￿L). From equation (11), we know that

















c(x￿;￿L) and q ￿ c(x￿￿;￿v) > 0. Also
without violation the growth of the stock is higher than what prevails in the presence of violation






v), hence x￿￿ << x￿
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose for simplicity that k(￿v
i) = 0. The zero pro￿t condition (i.e. equation 15) can be
restated as:
q(a(￿v) + (N ￿ 1)a(￿L))eioxo ￿ N&eio ￿ pi(￿v
i)Fo = 0 (A3)

















p(￿i) is the elasticity of hazard rate and "￿ = ￿ia￿
a(￿i) is the elasticity of catchability
coe¢ cient. From equation (A4), it follows that the necessary condition for existence of equilibrium
stock is "￿ < ￿￿
￿
1 + (N ￿ 1)a(￿L)￿￿(￿v)
￿
q. If ￿shing is done with the illegal mesh size x0





































i ) 2 (0;1) it follows that "￿ < ￿￿
Proof of Proposition 3.
From equations (10a) and (14a) we have F￿(￿;￿) = mi￿
p￿ +￿i where mi￿ = hi￿q+￿i (￿i￿ ￿ hi￿)￿
ki￿, and F￿￿
o (￿;￿) = mo￿
p￿ +￿i where mo￿ = hi￿q ￿ki￿. By comparing the two equations, it can be
seen that F￿ < F￿￿
o if ￿i (￿￿i ￿ hi￿) < 0. But we know that ￿￿i < 0 and hi￿ > 0 hence F￿ < F￿￿
o
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